Fourteenth Amendment--Peremptory Challenges by Defendants and the Equal Protection Clause by Gemskie, Michele A.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 83
Issue 4 Winter Article 9
Winter 1993
Fourteenth Amendment--Peremptory Challenges
by Defendants and the Equal Protection Clause
Michele A. Gemskie
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Michele A. Gemskie, Fourteenth Amendment--Peremptory Challenges by Defendants and the Equal Protection Clause, 83 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 920 (1992-1993)
0091- 4169/93/8304-0920
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 83, No. 4
Copyright © 1993 by Northwestern University, School of Law Pyintd in U.S.A.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY
DEFENDANTS AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Georgia v. McCollum, I the United States Supreme Court held
that a criminal defendant may not exercise a peremptory challenge
in a racially discriminatory manner. The Court extended the reach
of Batson v. Kentucky,2 which precluded a state prosecutor from exer-
cising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner,
and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,3 which precluded civil litigants
from exercising peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner, to encompass defendants in criminal cases as well.
This Note examines the use and limitations of peremptory chal-
lenges and argues that the Court reasonably protected the equal
protection rights of the juror to a greater extent than it protected
the defendant's statutory right to exercise unfettered peremptory
challenges. After summarizing the facts and opinions of the case,
this Note discusses how Georgia v. McCollum is consistent with post-
Batson caselaw. The Note then critiques and ultimately agrees with
the Court's reasoning in McCollum, specifically the Court's analysis
of whether a defendant really is and should be considered a state
actor; whether the State has standing to challenge a defendant's use
of peremptory challenges; and whether a juror's constitutional right
to equal protection should outweigh a defendant's statutory right to
exercise peremptory challenges. Furthermore, this Note analyzes
the implications of Georgia v. McCollum on future uses of peremptory
challenges, particularly when a minority defendant challenges a
non-minority juror.
1 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
2 476 U.S. 79 (1986).




The United States Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of
racial discrimination injury selection over a century ago in Strauder
v. West Virginia.4 At issue in that case was a West Virginia statute,
which allowed only "white male persons who are [at least] twenty-
one years of age . . . to serve as jurors."5 Strauder, an African-
American male, had been convicted and sentenced for murder by an
all-Caucasian jury.6 Strauder objected to the all-Caucasian venire7
and argued that he had the same constitutional right as Caucasians
to a jury of his racial peers.8
The Supreme Court held that the West Virginia statute denied
African-American defendants their equal protection rights when Af-
rican-Americans were precluded from the jury venire. 9 The Court
recognized that prejudices often exist in a community, and it rea-
soned that African-Americans had the same right as Caucasians to a
jury drawn from a panel that includes racial peers.10
The Supreme Court did not deal with racial discrimination at
the juror peremptory stage until Swain v. Alabama. 1 I The prosecutor
in Swain struck all six African-Americans on the jury venire using
peremptory challenges.1 2 The African-American defendant alleged
that the prosecutor violated the Fourteenth Amendment by using
peremptory challenges to obtain an all-Caucasian jury.13 The trial
court denied all of the defendant's motions, which were "based on
alleged invidious discrimination in the selection ofjurors," and the
defendant was convicted.14 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction on appeal. 15
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court con-
viction, placing a heavy burden on the defendant. 16 In order to suc-
cessfully challenge a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges, the
Supreme Court held that a defendant had to prove that the prosecu-
tor systematically exercised peremptory challenges against African-
4 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
5 Id at 305.
6 Id at 304.
7 Thejury venire is the group of citizens from which ajury is chosen in a given case.
The petit jury is the group of persons selected for the trial of a criminal or civil action.
8 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304.
9 Id at 310.
10 Id. at 309.
11 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
12 Id at 210.
13 Id
14 Id. at 203.
15 Id
16 Id at 227-28.
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Americans over a period of time.1 7 Since Swain only focused on the
discrimination of the prosecutor at his own trial, Swain was unable
to meet this strict test. 18
The Supreme Court removed this strict evidentiary burden
nineteen years later in Batson v. Kentucky. 19 In Batson, the trial court
denied the African-American defendant's motion to discharge the
petit jury, following the prosecutor's use of his peremptory chal-
lenges to remove all potential African-American jurors. 20 Rather
than requiring proof of systematic use of peremptory challenges
against African-Americans over a period of time, the Supreme Court
held that a defendant could establish a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination in a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in the
defendant's case alone.2' The Court stated that once the defendant
established that this discrimination occurred during the jury selec-
tion of his own trial, the burden then shifted to the State to establish
a race-neutral reason for excluding the jurors in question.22
The Court extended the reach of Batson in Powers v. Ohio.28 A
Caucasian defendant in Powers objected to the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude African-American venireper-
sons.24 Emphasizing the equal protection rights ofjurors, the Court
held that a criminal defendant can object to race-based peremptory
challenges, regardless of whether the defendant and the excluded
juror were of the same race.25 As a preliminary issue, the Court
held that the petitioner had standing to raise the equal protection
rights of the excluded jurors who were not parties to the case.26
In the same term, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
race-based peremptory challenges during civil proceedings in the
case of Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 27 Relying on Batson, an Afri-
can-American civil litigant argued that opposing counsel was re-
quired to articulate a race-neutral reason for excluding two African-
Americans from the prospective petit jury. The Court recognized
that protection of individual liberty and equal protection applied
17 Id. at 227.
18 Id. at 224.
19 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
20 Id. at 83.
21 Id. at 92-95.
22 Id. at 97.
23 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
24 Id. at 1367.
25 Id. at 1366.
26 Id. at 1370-74.
27 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
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historically only to government actions. 28 Thus, as a dispositive is-
sue, the Court determined that a civil litigant acted as a state actor
when the litigant exercised peremptory challenges. 29 As in Powers,
the Court also found that a civil litigant had standing to raise ex-
cluded jurors' equal protection rights.30 Thus, civil litigants could
utilize the same approach to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination during peremptory challenges as criminal defendants
in Batson.3 t
Batson dealt with prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges,
and Edmonson dealt with the use of peremptory challenges by civil
litigants. After these two cases, the constitutionality of race-based
peremptory challenges by criminal defendants remained unsettled.
The Supreme Court resolved this issue in the present case, Georgia v.
McCollum.3 2
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 10, 1990, a Dougherty County, Georgia, grand jury
returned a six-count indictment that charged the Caucasian respon-
dents with beating and assaulting an African-American couple.33
Before jury selection began, the prosecution claimed that de-
fense counsel intended to strike African-Americans from the petit
jury due to the racially charged nature of the case.3 4 The State filed
a pretrial motion to prevent defense counsel from exercising its pre-
emptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, despite de-
fense counsel's contention that the nature of the case gave defense
the right to intentionally exclude African-Americans.35
The State contended that Dougherty County's population at
the time was 437o African-American.3 6 Accordingly, the State ar-
gued that a statistically representative jury panel of forty-two mem-
bers would contain eighteen African-Americans. 37  Since
respondents had twenty peremptory challenges, respondents could
potentially eliminate all possible African-Americans jurors.38 Rely-
28 Id- at 2082 (citing Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191
(1988)).
29 Id. at 2082-87.
30 Itt at 2087-88.
31 Id. at 2088-89.
32 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).








ing on Batson v. Kentucky, 3 9 the Sixth Amendment, 40 and the Georgia
Constitution, the State sought an order requiring respondents to ar-
ticulate a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory challenges,
once the State established a prima facie racial discrimination case.4 1
The trial court denied the State's motion, stating that neither
federal law nor Georgia law prohibited criminal defendants from us-
ing peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.42
The issue was certified for immediate appeal.43
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling in
a 4-3 decision.44 The court distinguished Edmonson v. Leesville Con-
crete Co.,45 which prohibited civil litigants from exercising peremp-
tory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, from the present
case, which dealt with a criminal defendant.46 Three justices dis-
sented, arguing that Edmonson and other decisions by the Supreme
Court established that racially based peremptory challenges violated
the Constitution. 47 The Georgia Supreme Court denied a motion
for reconsideration. 48
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine "whether the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from
engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of per-
emptory challenges." 4 9
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,50 reversed the decision
of the Georgia Supreme Court and held that the Constitution pro-
39 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) ("[A] defendant may make a prima facie showing of pur-
poseful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by relying solely of the facts con-
cerning its selection in his case.").
40 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State. .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
41 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2351-52.
42 Id. at 2352.
43 Id.
44 State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688 (Ga. 1991).
45 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
46 McCollum, 405 S.E.2d at 689.
47 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2352 (citing McCollum, 405 S.E.2d at 689 (HuntJ, dissent-
ing); McCollum, 405 S.E.2d at 690 (Benham, J., dissenting); McCollum, 405 S.E.2d at 693
(Fletcher, J., dissenting)).
48 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2352.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 2351. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, Kennedy, and
Souterjoined in the opinion. ChiefJustice Rehnquist also filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in judgment. Justice O'Connor and Justice
Scalia each filed dissenting opinions.
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hibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimina-
tion on the basis of race when exercising peremptory challenges. 5'
Justice Blackmun began by presenting the chain of cases that
abolished race as a factor for jury selection.52 In Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia,53 the Court held unconstitutional a state statute which allowed
only Caucasian men to serve on juries.54 Nearly a century later, in
Swain v. Alabama, the Court recognized that systematic exclusion of
African-Americans over a period of time could constitute a violation
of equal protection; nonetheless, the Court did not find a violation
in that case.5 5 The Court discarded Swain's "evidentiary formula-
tion" in Batson v. Kentucky 5 6 and instead held that a prima facie case
of discrimination could be established simply from the peremptory
challenges of the prosecutor at the defendant's own trial.57 In Pow-
ers v. Ohio,58 the Court extended Batson by holding that a prosecutor
was prohibited from excluding African-American jurors on the basis
of race in the criminal trial of a Caucasian defendant.59 Finally, in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 60 the Court held that civil litigants
could not exercise their peremptory challenges in a racially discrimi-
natory manner.61
Taking elements from each of the prior cases, Justice Blackmun
then established a four-part inquiry to determine whether criminal
defendants should be prevented from exercising their peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.6 2 First, the Court
must inquire whether the criminal defendant's exercise of peremp-
tory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner causes the same
harms addressed by Batson.6 3 Second, the Court must decide
whether the exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal defend-
ant constitutes state action.6 4 Third, the Court must examine
whether prosecutors have standing to raise this constitutional is-
51 lId at 2359.
52 Id. at 2352-53.
53 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
54 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2352 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879)).
55 Id. (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
56 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a prosecutor may not act in a racially discrimina-
tory manner when exercising peremptory challenges).
57 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2352-53.
58 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
59 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353.
60 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
61 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353.
62 Id.




sue.65 Finally, the Court must decide whether the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants nonetheless preclude the extension of
precedents to this case. 66
1. Does a criminal defendant's exercise of racially discriminatory
peremptory challenge cause the same harms addressed by Batson?
In the first inquiry, Justice Blackmun reasoned that a criminal
defendant who exercised racially discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges inflicted the same harms that were addressed by Batson.67
When a defendant excludes jurors based on race, individual jurors
are harmed by being potentially subjected to "open and public ra-
cial discrimination." 68 Furthermore, whether discriminatory chal-
lenges are raised by the prosecution or the defense, excluding
jurors on account of race undermines public confidence in the
American judicial system, especially in race-related crime cases. 69
Justice Blackmun concluded that public confidence in the criminal
justice system is undermined by the use of racially discriminatory
peremptory challenges when an acquittal is obtained, just as much
as when a conviction is obtained.70
2. Does a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges constitute
state action?
In deciding whether the exercise of peremptory challenges by a
criminal defendant constitutes a state action, the Court applied the
two-prong test it stated in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 71 Accord-
ing to Edmonson, the first inquiry is "whether the claimed constitu-
tional deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or
privilege having its source in state authority. 72 As in Edmonson,73
the McCollum Court found that peremptory challenges satisfy this
requirement since state laws provide the right and scope of peremp-
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 2353-54.
68 Id. at 2353.
69 Id. at 2354. ("In such cases, emotions in the affected community will inevitably be
heated and volatile. Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system is
essential for preserving community peace in trials involving race-related crimes.")
70 Id.
71 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082-87 (1991) (holding that the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges by civil litigants constituted state action for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause). The Court adopted the test from Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
937 (1982), which held that a corporate creditor and its president acted under color of
state law in depriving debtor of property through state action.
72 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082-87 (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939).




The second inquiry is "whether the private party charged with
the deprivation can be described as a state actor."' 75 In deciding
whether a defendant is a state actor, the Court relied on three fac-
tors: 1) "the extent to which the actor relies on governmental assist-
ance and benefits;" 2) "whether the actor is performing a traditional
government function," and 3) "whether the injury caused is aggra-
vated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority."76
As to the first factor, Justice Blackmun determined that the
criminal defendant in McCollum relied on "governmental assistance
and benefits" which were equivalent to the assistance and benefits
provided to the civil litigants in Edmonson.77 Justice Blackmun stated
that the Edmonson Court determined that by enforcing a racially dis-
criminatory peremptory challenge in a civil context the Court has
chosen to place its "'power, property and prestige behind the [al-
leged] discrimination.' ",78 The Court would similarly enforce per-
emptory challenges in a criminal context, even those raised by
criminal defendants.
Furthermore, in examining whether the actor is performing a
traditional government function, the Court found that the selection
of a jury in a criminal case "fulfills a unique and constitutionally
compelled government function."' 79 The Sixth Amendment man-
dates an impartial jury for criminal defendants.80 Thus, peremptory
challenges in a criminal case perform a more compelling traditional
function than peremptory challenges in civil cases. Furthermore,
Justice Blackmun concluded that the State cannot avoid its constitu-
tional responsibility to ensure an impartial jury by delegating an es-
sentially public function to private parties.81
Finally, the Court analyzed whether the injury caused by the
private party is aggravated by the incidents of governmental author-
ity. The Court found that the injury to ajuror, who is challenged on
74 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (1992).
75 Id. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42).
76 Id (citing Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083).
77 Id. The Court in Edmonson determined that the "government summons jurors,
constrains their freedom of movement, and subjects them to public scrutiny and exami-
nation.... Without the direct and indispensable participation of the judge, who beyond
all question is a state actor, the peremptory challenge system would serve no purpose."
Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2184-85.
78 Id. (quoting Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2084 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
79 Id
80 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State . .
81 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355-56.
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the basis of race, is intensified in the courtroom setting because the
actions will be attributed to the state, no matter who excused the
jurors.8 2
The Court reasoned that the holding in Polk County v. Dodson,83
which stated that a public defender does not qualify as a public actor
when engaged in the general representation of a criminal defend-
ant, did not preclude a finding of state action.84 Rather, when per-
forming a peremptory challenge, the defendant, though a private
body, is still choosing a jury, which is "a quintessential government
body." 85 As in Edmonson, a private body must be held to the "consti-
tutional mandate of race neutrality" when the government has con-
ferred the power to choose the jury onto it.86 Furthermore, the
Court found that the defendant's private interest in being acquitted
does not conflict with a finding of state action.
7
3. Do prosecutors have standing to raise a constitutional challenge to a
defendant's action?
Once the Court found that McCollum involved the same harm as
Batson and that the actions of the defendant constituted a state ac-
tion, the Court turned to the question of whether the prosecution
had standing to raise a constitutional challenge to the defendant's
actions on behalf of the excluded jurors.88 The Court used the
three-prong test from Powers v. Ohio89 to determine that the State
had standing to sue as a third party. 90 The three prongs were: 1)
whether the State has suffered a concrete injury; 2) whether the
State has a close relationship to the excluded juror; and 3) whether
the excluded juror was hindered from protecting his or her own
82 Id. at 2356. In Edmonson, the Court noted that "[flew places are a more real ex-
pression of the constitutional authority of the government than a courtroom, where the
law itself unfolds .... Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents
the idea of democratic government from becoming a reality. Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556
(1979)). The Court in Powers likewise noted that "racial discrimination in the qualifica-
tion or selection ofjurors offends the dignity of persons and the integrity of the courts."
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
83 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
84 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
85 Id.
86 Id. (quoting Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085).
87 Id. at 2355-57.
88 Id. at 2357.
89 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370-71 (1991) (holding that a Caucasian criminal defendant has
standing to raise the equal protection rights of potential African-American jurors ex-
cluded from a jury on account of race).




The Court found that the State met all three prongs of the Pow-
ers test.9 2 First, the State suffered a concrete injury since the fairness
and integrity of its own judicial process was undermined.93 Second,
the Court found a close relationship existed between an excluded
juror and the State. For example, during voir dire, a relationship is
forged between the juror and the State.94 Furthermore, the State is
the representative of its citizens and hence the logical party to assert
a violation of constitutional rights. 95 Finally, the Court found that
the barriers for excluded jurors to bring a claim to court were as
daunting as the barriers forjurors in Powers96 or Edmonson.97 Since a
suit requires an immense expenditure of time and money, and does
not guarantee a favorable outcome in return for the juror's effort,
the excluded jurors would be effectively hindered from protecting
their own interests. Given that the State satisfied all three prongs of
the Powers test, the Court held that the State had standing to raise a
constitutional challenge to the defendant's actions. 98
4. Do the constitutional rights of criminal defendant's preclude extension of
precedents ?
In deciding whether the interests served by Batson should give
way to a defendant's rights, the Court first established that peremp-
tory challenges are not guaranteed constitutional rights; rather, they
are "but one state-created means to the constitutional end of an im-
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. The McCollum Court did not explain exactly how the judicial process was un-
dermined. However, in Powers, the Court found that the "purpose of the jury system is
to impress upon the criminal defendant and the community as a whole that a verdict or
conviction is given in accordance with the law by persons who are fair. The verdict will
not be accepted or understood in these terms if the jury is chosen by unlawful means at
the outset." Powers, 111 S. Ct at 1372.
94 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1372). The Powers
Court further noted that a "rejected juror may lose confidence in the court and its ver-
dicts, as may the defendant if his or her objections cannot be heard." Powers, 111 S. Ct.
at 1372.
95 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357.
96 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1364. The Powers Court found that the barriers for a juror to
bring suit included difficulty in obtaining declaratory or injunctive relief when discrimi-
nation occurs; difficulty in "showing a likelihood that discrimination against him in the
voir dire state will recur;" and the great economic burdens of litigation versus the small
financial stake involved. Id. at 1373.
97 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (holding that a civil
litigant has standing to raise the equal protection rights of potential African-American
jurors excluded from a jury on account of race).
98 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357.
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partial jury and fair trial." 99 Furthermore, the right to a peremptory
challenge may be withheld without impairing the constitutional
guarantee of an impartial jury and fair trial.100 Therefore, Justice
Blackmun argued, the McCollum decision would not impede the ad-
ministration of justice, nor violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights. 10 1 While the Court recognized the importance of peremp-
tory challenges, it argued that defense counsel is limited to "legiti-
mate, lawful conduct."' 0 2 Moreover, the Court argued that it is an
"affront to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the right to dis-
criminate against a group of citizens based on their race."' 03 The
Court also found that a prohibition on race-based peremptory chal-
lenges does not violate a defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel. 10 4 Since defense counsel can usually explain the reason for
exercising a peremptory challenge without revealing strategy, the
prohibition on racially motivated peremptory challenges would not
impair an attorney's defense tactics. 10 5
Finally, the Court held that prohibiting race-based peremptory
challenges does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
a fair trial by an impartial jury. 10 6 Justice Blackmun distinguished
between challenging ajuror solely on account of race, which is unac-
ceptable discrimination, and challenging a juror who harbors racial
prejudice, which is a legitimate use of the peremptory challenge for
cause. 10 7 Assumptions of partiality based on race are not a legiti-
mate basis to disqualify a potential juror.10 8 To decide otherwise,
the Court would be accepting "as a defense to racial discrimination
the very stereotype the law condemns."' 0 9 Hence, the Court reaf-
firmed that a peremptory challenge should not be based on either
the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the challenging
party. 0
99 Id. at 2357-58.
100 Id. at 2358 (citing Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n.11 (1948)).
101 Id.





107 Id. at 2358-59.
108 Id. at 2359.
109 Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991)).
110 Id. at 2359.
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B. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS
1. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's Concurrence
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in the opinion of the Court, but
also filed a short concurring opinion,"' reaffirming his dissent in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co."12 Though he continued to believe
that Edmonson was wrongly decided, Chief Justice Rehnquist be-
lieved that Edmonson controlled the disposition of this case on the
issue of "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment." 13
2. Justice Thomas' Concurrence
In his separate opinion, Justice Thomas also concurred in the
judgment of the Court, agreeing with Chief Justice Rehnquist that
Edmonson governed this case. 1 4 Justice Thomas, however, believed
that the Court was getting too involved in limiting peremptory chal-
lenges.115 Justice Thomas looked back to Strauder v. West Virginia,116
in which the Court struck down a statute that prohibited African-
Americans from sitting on juries. 1 7 Part of the Court's rationale
behind striking down the statute was the belief that jurors could,
and did, harbor prejudices. Thomas argued that peremptory chal-
lenges could have helped prevent that potential problem. 81 8 He ar-
gued that the departure from that belief has had negative
consequences.11 9
First, Justice Thomas argued that the majority decision exalted
the right ofjurors to sit on a trial over the right of a defendant who
faced imprisonment or even death. 120 While Justice Thomas recog-
nized that the decision protected jurors, he also argued that defend-
ants were left unprotected against racial animus. 121 Second, Justice
Thomas characterized this decision as a slippery slope toward elimi-
nating peremptory challenges altogether. 122 He predicted that in
I 11 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
112 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist
joined the dissent ofJustice O'Connor, who argued that a peremptory strike by a private
litigant is fundamentally a private choice and not state action.
113 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
114 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
115 Id. (ThomasJ., concurring).
116 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
117 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359-60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
118 Id. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring).
119 Id. (ThomasJ., concurring).
120 Id. (ThomasJ., concurring).
121 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Unless jurors actually admit prejudices during voir
dire, defendants generally must allow them to sit and run the risk that racial animus will
affect the verdict.").
122 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
1993]
932 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 83
the future the Court may have to decide whether African-American
defendants may strike Caucasian venirepersons, or whether parties
may exercise peremptory challenges based on sex.123  Justice
Thomas concluded that whatever benefits the Court had previously
found for having members of a criminal defendant's race on his or
her jury124 had evaporated with this decision. 125
C. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
1. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
Justice O'Connor dissented primarily on the ground that crimi-
nal defendants are not state actors, and thus, the Constitution does
not prevent defendants from acting in a racially discriminatory man-
ner while performing a traditional trial function. 126 Therefore, ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, the State's claim should have been
rejected. 127
Justice O'Connor accepted the two-part test announced in
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 128 but argued that a criminal defendant
cannot be deemed a state actor. 129 She referred to Polk County v.
Dodson, °30 in which the Court reasoned that public defenders per-
forming traditional defense functions were not state actors because
they were acting as defense attorneys in other relevant respects. 13 1
She pointed out the absurdity of having defendants and their coun-
sel "transmogrify" from governmental adversaries into state actors
when they exercised peremptory challenges, and then back again
into non-state actors when they performed other defense
functions. ' 3 2
Furthermore, while Justice O'Connor reasserted her dissent in
123 Id. at 2360-61 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas did not predict the out-
comes of such cases.
124 Justice Thomas referred to the Strauder decision where the Court found that, due
to prejudices in a community, compelling an African-American to "submit to a trial for
his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the State has expressly excluded every
man of his race, because of color alone," was a denial of equal protection. Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1879).
125 McCollum 112 S. Ct. at 2361 (Thomas, J., concurring).
126 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor dissented for similar reasons in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2089-95 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
127 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128 457 U.S. 937 (1982).
129 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2361-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
131 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2361-62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 2362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the Edmonson 133 decision, she still found the present case distin-
guishable. 134 During the jury selection process, she reasoned, civil
litigants do not have an adversarial relationship and they work to-
ward the same end.13 5 However, this is not true in criminal cases. A
criminal defendant seeks to strike jurors predisposed to convict,
while the State seeks to strike jurors who are predisposed to
acquit.1 3 6
Justice O'Connor further argued that the result sought by the
majority may, in fact, backfire. Rather than achieving nondiscrimi-
natory criminal justice, the loss of peremptory challenges may de-
crease the chance to secure minority representation on the jury. 3 7
In support of her assertion, Justice O'Connor referred to the
NAACP amicus brief, which argued that the only way for a minority
defendant to ensure adequate minority representation was to use
peremptory challenges to strike members of the majority race.' 3 8
2. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia delivered a separate dissent, in which he agreed
with Justice O'Connor that a criminal defendant does not act on be-
half of the state.' 39 He differed from her reasoning in that he did
not believe Edmonson was distinguishable in principle.' 40 Justice
Scalia further asserted that the "activist, 'evolutionary' constitu-
tional jurisprudence" did not promote greater individual rights, but
instead, destroyed the "ages-old right of criminal defendants to ex-
ercise peremptory challenges as they wish, to secure ajury that they
consider fair."'14 '
V. ANALYSIS
With the McCollum decision, the Supreme Court has further lim-
ited the statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges. The
Court began its attack on peremptory challenges by finding that the
exercise of a peremptory challenge by a criminal defendant is con-
133 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
134 McColIum, 112 S. Ct. at 2363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086).
136 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'37 Id. at 2364 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Seeking Reversal, 9-10, Georgia v. McCollum,
112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (No. 91-372) [hereinafter Brief for NAACP]).
'39 Id. at 2364-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140 Id at 2365 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141 Id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sidered a state action. 1 42 The majority correctly extended prior de-
cisions which had established that the exercise of peremptory
challenges constituted state action when exercised by prosecutors 143
and civil litigants. 144 The Court also properly found that a prosecu-
tor has standing to bring a suit on behalf of jurors, by extending
prior decisions which had granted standing to defendants' 45 and
civil litigants 46 on behalf of the jurors challenged on the basis of
race. Finally, the Court sealed the fate of peremptory challenges
when it found that a juror's constitutional right to equal protection
trumps a criminal defendant's statutory right to exercise a peremp-
tory challenge without any restrictions. 14 7 Essentially, the Court, in
balancing the jurors' rights to equal protection with the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, found that a fair trial does not
include a right to unfettered peremptory challenges. 148 As a result
of the limitations on peremptory challenges permitted by the Court
in McCollum, this Note argues that the Court is apt to further limit
the exercise of peremptory challenges in the future.
A. THE COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT THE EXERCISE OF A
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE BY A DEFENDANT IS A STATE
ACTION
The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution 49 applies only
to government actions.' 50 Racial discrimination, though offensive
in other ways, violates the Constitution only when it is attributed to
state action.' 5 ' As a dispositive issue, the Court needed to inquire
whether the exercise of a peremptory challenge was, in fact, a state
action.
The landmark Batson 152 decision did not expressly address the
state-action issue since it appeared self-evident that a prosecutor
142 Id. at 2355-57.
143 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
144 See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. 2077.
145 See Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
146 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
147 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2358 (1992).
148 Id. at 2359.
149 "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
150 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) ("Embed-
ded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state action,
which is subject to scrutiny under the Amendment's Due Process Clause, and private
conduct, against which the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how unfair that
conduct may be." Id. at 191 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
151 Id.; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
152 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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was a state actor. In contrast, the defendant in McCollum acted on
his own behalf and in his own defense. It is not as self-evident that
in this context the defendant's act of exercising a peremptory chal-
lenge constitutes state action within the same meaning.
On the surface, the Court's conclusion that the criminal defend-
ant in McCollum was a state actor seems disingenuous. However, the
Court was bound by its prior decision in Edmonson. 153 The McCollum
Court essentially held that the mere exercise of the peremptory
challenge constituted state action.154 In the civil case of Edmonson,
the Court used the two-prong Lugar' 55 test to conclude that a state
action exists when a civil litigant exercises a peremptory chal-
lenge.' 56 The emerging focus was thus on the excluded juror,
rather than the litigant. The McCollum Court followed the Edmonson
decision, utilizing the Lugar two-part analysis,' 57 and found that the
exercise of a peremptory challenge by a criminal defendant was like-
wise a state action.
The majority easily satisfied the first inquiry, namely that the
exercise of the right to a peremptory challenge had its source in
state authority. 58 As in Edmonson, the Court found that the legisla-
ture both authorized and limited the use of peremptory chal-
lenges.' 59 Furthermore, peremptory challenges exist only in the
courtroom and are only permitted when the government, by statute
or decisional law, deems it appropriate to allow parties to exclude
otherwise qualified persons from the jury.16 0 Thus, the majority
logically analogized the peremptory challenge in a civil case, such as
Edmonson, to a peremptory challenge exercised in a criminal case.
The Court then met the second inquiry, that the defendant can
be described as a state actor, by following the three principles ap-
plied in the civil case of Edmonson.161 In her dissent, however, Jus-
153 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082-87 (1991) (holding
that civil litigants are state actors when exercising peremptory challenges).
154 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354-57 (1992).
'55 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1991) ("The first question is
whether the claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege
having its source in state authority. The second question is whether, under the facts of
this case, respondents, who are private parties, may be appropriately characterized as
'state actors.' "). See supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
156 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082-87.
157 See Mark L. Josephs, Fourteenth Amendment-Peremptory Challenges and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 82 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1000, 1012-18 (1992), for a comparison and
critique of the various possible state action tests.
158 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (1992).
159 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
160 Id.
161 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355.
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tice O'Connor strenuously argued that the majority could not
square this decision with Polk County v. Dodson.162 In Dodson, the
Court held that a public defender does not act under color of state
law when performing a lawyer's traditional function in representing
an indigent defendant in state criminal proceedings. 16 Justice
O'Connor found it hard to believe "that defendants and their law-
yers transmogrify from government adversaries into state actors
when they exercise a peremptory challenge, and then change back
to perform other defense functions."' 164 The majority in McCollum
correctly countered that the Dodson court did not hold that a public
defendant never acts as a state actor. 165 According to the majority,
the specific actions of the public defendant in Dodson were adver-
sarial; when exercising a peremptory challenge, however, a public
defender is acting as a state actor.' 66 It is conceivable that when
participating in different parts of a trial, a lawyer may perform differ-
ent functions.
Justice O'Connor's attempts to distinguish the civil Edmonson
case from the present McCollum criminal case also fail because the
governmental benefits and authority require a finding of state ac-
tion. She correctly points out that the interests of the criminal de-
fendant and the State are at odds during a criminal trial.167 While
the defendant seeks to strike jurors predisposed to convict, the State
seeks to strike jurors predisposed to acquit. 168 Justice O'Connor
correctly reasoned that the defense and the State's motives and in-
terests differ. However, after the Edmonson 169 decision, the Court
was bound to find that a challenge is still a state action when exer-
cised by any party to a criminal or civil case.
B. THE COURT PROPERLY EXPANDED STANDING IN EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAIMS TO INCLUDE ALL RELEVANT PARTIES IN
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL TRIALS
The Court in Batson did not decide the issue of non-party stand-
ing since the defendant raised his own equal protection rights to
prevent the prosecutor from exercising a racially discriminatory per-
162 Id. at 2361-62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
312 (1981)).
163 Dodson, 454 U.S. at 320-25.
164 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 2356.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 2362-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 2363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
169 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082-87 (1991).
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emptory challenge.170 In McCollum, the Court had to decide if the
government had standing to raise the Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights of the excluded jurors. This Note argues that the
Court properly relied on Powers v. Ohio 171 and Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co. 172 to award the government standing.
In Powers, a criminal defendant successfully sought standing to
assert the excluded jurors' equal protection rights. 173 In Edmonson,
the Court likewise found that a civil litigant had standing to bring a
claim on behalf of excluded jurors.1 74 Both cases demonstrate the
Court's emerging focus on jurors' rights. The Court continued this
emphasis in McCollum. Although both Powers and McCollum dealt
with a non-government party, the three-part Powers 175 test should be
applicable to the government by analogy. The McCollum Court
properly found that the State had met the three prongs of Powers
since: 1) the State had suffered a concrete injury, in that the fairness
and integrity of the judicial process were undermined; 2) the State
had a close relationship to the excluded juror; and 3) the excluded
jurors were hindered from protecting their own interests and thus
properly relied on the State to protect their rights.176
The McCollum decision did not depart from the Court's recent
decisions about standing in peremptory challenge cases. The radi-
cal departure from the standing doctrine occurred in Powers v.
Ohio, 177 in which a Caucasian defendant raised the equal protection
rights of excluded African-Americans. This approach reached be-
yond prior cases such as Batson, which dealt with the equal protec-
tion rights of the defendant himself. The Court in Powers
determined that the "cognizable injury" to the defendant was the
perceptions of unfairness in the judicial process. 178 Justice Scalia, in
his dissent in Powers, criticized the majority's tenuous findings and
argued that the perception of unfairness was not an "injury in fact"
to the defendant. 179 He argued that the defendant has suffered a
cognizable injury only because the Court "made it true by saying
so."180 Yet, once the Powers decision departed from the historical
170 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
171 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
172 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
173 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370-73.
174 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087-88.
175 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370-71. The three-part test is taken directly from Singleton
v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
176 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357 (1992).
177 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366 (1991).
178 Id at 1371.
179 Id. at 1379 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 1380 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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standing doctrine by attenuating the "injury-in-fact" requirement,
the Court did not have to wander far to find standing for the de-
fendant in McCollum. Whether or not the Court was correct in Pow-
ers, the Court clearly indicated its intention to be consistent in
McCollum.
The reasons the Court found standing for a criminal defendant
in Powers and a civil litigant in Edmonson are even stronger for the
State in McCollum. The State suffers a greater injury than a criminal
defendant since the State's judicial process is undermined if citizens,
and jurors in particular, question the system's integrity. Further-
more, the State has a closer relationship with the jurors than do the
defendants or civil litigants since both the jury and the State are
supposed to represent citizens as a whole. 181 Finally, the barriers
for a juror to bring his own suit are as daunting as the majority
claims.18 2 There is little chance that a juror would expend the time
and energy to bring a suit for being struck from jury duty.18 3
C. THE COURT ELEVATES A JUROR'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS OVER
A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S STATUTORY RIGHT TO EXERCISE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to a fair and impartial jury.18 4 Batson protected criminal de-
fendants by disabling prosecutors from exercising peremptory chal-
lenges with discriminatory intent.18 5 The Court held that the
defendant had the right to ask that a prosecutor give a race-neutral
reason for excluding a juror so that the defendant could be satisfied
that an impartial jury had been chosen.18 6 In McCollum, the criminal
defendant did not complain about the lack of a fair trial; rather the
State alleged that the defendant was improperly excluding jurors. 187
The criminal justice system places fairness at a premium for the
criminal defendant. Justice Thomas aptly argued that the defendant
is the one who faces an extended jail term and perhaps even
death. 188 Thus, the defendant typically gets the benefit of the doubt
in a criminal trial. For instance, the State must carry the burden of
proving a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The sys-
181 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357 (1992).
182 Id.
183 However, a juror who is repeatedly stricken during the peremptory challenge
stage on account of race may be angered enough to bring a civil suit.
184 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
185 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
186 Id.
187 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2351 (1992).
188 Id. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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tem would rather acquit a guilty person than convict an innocent
person.189 Through such criminal procedures, the system often
protects the defendant.
In contrast, the rights ofjurors are not as well-protected. The
Constitution does not guarantee ajuror the right to sit on a particu-
lar petitjury. °90 Over a century ago, the Supreme Court held it un-
constitutional to prevent African-Americans from participating in
jury service after a defendant sought to maintain representation of
his race on the jury in order to overcome potential racial bias. 19 1
The Strauder decision emphasized that racial bias often exists in ju-
ries and can harm a criminal defendant.19 2 Justice Thomas argued
that the majority's decision in McCollum would lead to negative con-
sequences by disregarding the Strauder findings.' 93 A defendant no
longer has the unfettered right to challenge a juror whom he or she
feels may harbor racial animus.194 The result could harm criminal
defendants in that jurors who harbor racial prejudice against the de-
fendant may not be automatically struck from the jury.19 5
Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Powers, argued that the basis for
prior equal protection cases "was that the State had violated the de-
fendant's right to equal protection, because it had excluded jurors of
his race."' 96 The Court changed the emphasis from the defendant
to the juror, when it allowed standing for the defendant in Powers,
and now McCollum, to raise the equal protection rights of excluded
jurors.
The Court balanced the equal protection rights of the jurors
against the statutory rights of defendants to exercise peremptory
challenges and correctly found that the jurors' rights should prevail.
Although the potential injury is greater to a defendant than to an
189 "MIthe requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case [is]
bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
190 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1989) (venire, not petit jury, must represent fair
cross section of the community).
191 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (The State denies an African-
American equal protection when put on trial before a jury from which members of his
race have been purposely excluded).
192 Id. at 309.
193 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
194 Although the defendant may challenge a juror for cause if the juror expresses ra-
cial prejudice, jurors often do not vocalize such prejudice. The defendant no longer has
the "luxury" of using peremptory challenges freely to remove jurors suspect of harbor-
ing racial prejudice. Rather, the defendant now has the more difficult burden of proving
cause or vocalizing a race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge.
195 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring).
196 Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1375 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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improperly excluded juror, the Court properly heeded the Four-
teenth Amendment command that persons are entitled to equal pro-
tection under the law.19 7 Racial discrimination is not to be tolerated
by state actors. Jurors do not expect to be discriminated against,
especially in a court of law. Even when the defendant excludes a
juror, it appears that the State and the court are condoning the chal-
lenge because the challenge occurs in a courtroom and the judge
orders the juror to leave. This constitutes significant participation
on the part of the State, contrary to Justice O'Connor's contention
in her Edmonson dissent. s98 If a peremptory challenge is exercised
on the basis of race, the action is logically attributed to the criminal
justice system, regardless of who exercised the challenge. The en-
tire legitimacy of the criminal system thus is questioned.
D. THE COURT WILL LIKELY EXTEND THE MCCOLLUM DECISION TO
COVER MINORITY DEFENDANTS AS WELL
In its amicus brief, the NAACP urged that McCollum be limited
to the facts of the case. 199 The NAACP argued that in situations
where the defendant is a minority, the defendant should have the
right to strike jurors of the majority race.200 Cases of minority de-
fendants striking jurors of the majority race may come again to the
Court's attention.20'
Several reasons exist for limiting the decision of this case to
197 The Fourteenth Amendment states in part that "[n]o State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
198 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2090 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (federal government's participation in the peremptory process does not indi-
cate that government is responsible for the potential discrimination).
199 Brief for NAACP, see supra note 138, at 5.
200 Id. at 11-12.
201 Since the McCollum decision, the United States Supreme Court has already granted
certiorari in such a case. Georgia v. Carr, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992). The Georgia Supreme
Court had previously allowed its decision in State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688 (Ga.
1991), to control its decision to allow minority defendant to use race-based peremptory
challenges against Caucasians. State v. Carr, 413 S.E.2d 192 (Ga. 1992), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 30 (1992) (No. 91-1493). The United States Supreme Court vacated the
lower court's decision and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia for
further consideration in light of Georgia v. McCollum. Carr, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992). Further-
more, in applying Georgia v. McCollum to a similar case with Caucasian jurors, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the constitutional prohibition against exercise of
racially-based peremptory challenges does extend to African-American defendants who
challenge prospective Caucasian jurors. State v. Knox, 609 So. 2d 803 (La. 1992). Fur-




Caucasian defendants only. First, racial prejudice against minorities
still exists in our society. Second, it is much easier, logistically, for a
party to strike all minority jurors than all majority jurors. Third, as
Justice O'Connor pointed out in her dissent, racism can affect how
white jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts at trial.20 2
For example, attorneys often rely on "seat of the pants instinct" in
choosing when to exercise a peremptory challenge. 203 Such in-
stincts are ordinarily insufficient to prove cause.20 4 As Justice Black-
mun argued in the majority opinion, if a juror blatantly admits
prejudice, then he or she is excused for cause.205 However, seldom
is a juror so forthcoming. Most importantly, inquisition by the
Court into a venireperson's racial prejudices is not constitutionally
mandated. 20 6 As a result, a criminal defendant may be left with few
tools to choose a petit jury that he or she feels is completely
impartial.
Justice Scalia argued in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. that
prohibiting a defendant from exercising peremptory challenges
based on race would result in a "net loss" for all minority liti-
gants.20 7 The practical effect of such a decision, for example, could
be to prevent minority defendants from seating jurors of their own
race.208 In cases where a minority defendant faces a venire in which
his racial group is under-represented, the defendant may need to
strike jurors of the majority race in order to maintain minority rep-
resentation on the jury.20 9 It is important to remember, however,
that while the Constitution mandates an impartial jury for a criminal
defendant, it does not entitle a criminal defendant to a partial jury in
his or her favor. The Court has repeatedly stated that it is a false
assumption that African-Americans as a group are not qualified to
serve as jurors, 210 and it would be consistent for the Court to make
the same conclusions regarding Caucasians as a group.
There is little reason to believe, however, that the Supreme
202 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2364 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
203 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
204 Id at 105-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
205 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358-59.
206 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1975) (Voir dire questioning directed to racial prej-
udice is not constitutionally required).
207 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2095 (1991) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("[Tihe minority defendant can no longer seek to prevent an all-white jury, or
to seat as many jurors of his own race as possible.").
208 Id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209 Brief for the NAACP, see supra note 138, at 9-11.
210 See Powers v. Ohio, 11 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
86 (1986); Norris v. Alabama, 55 U.S. 587, 599 (1935).
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Court will retreat from the precedents of Batson, 2 11 Powers,2 12 Edmon-
son, 2 13 and now McCollum. 2 14 In preventing prosecutors from using
race-based peremptory challenges against minorities, the Court in
Batson claimed it was following its "unceasing efforts to eradicate
racial discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire from
which individual jurors are drawn. '215 The decision in Powers, to
extend Batson to prevent striking minority jurors in criminal trials of
Caucasian defendants, implied that it is the juror's right to equal
protection-not the defendant's-that is of primary concern. The
Powers Court held that "[a]n individual juror does not have the right
to sit on a particularjury, but he or she does possess the right not to
be excluded from one on account of race."21 6 This tenet was re-
ferred to in the majority opinion of McCollum as well.2 17
Despite the potential harms to the minority defendant, com-
ments from Supreme Court justices indicate the Court is likely to
extend the McCollum decision to cases with minority defendants.
Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Edmonson, predicted that the Edmonson
decision would extend to minority defendants in criminal trials.218
Likewise, Justice Thomas, in a footnote in his dissent in McCollum,
recognized the NAACP's arguments but stated that "it is difficult to
see how the result could be any different if the defendants here were
black." 219 The majority decision of McCollum argued that "it is an
affront to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the right to dis-
criminate against a group of citizens based upon their race." 220
Though McCollum involved a Caucasian defendant, the Court's rea-
soning would apply no matter what race the defendant is, for to do




The McCollum Court addressed an important issue left open by
211 Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
212 Powers, 111 S. Ct. 1364.
213 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. 2077.
214 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
215 Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 (emphasis added).
216 Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370.
217 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353.
218 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2095 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
219 McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 2358 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
221 The Supreme Court may soon decide whether or not parties to civil and criminal
cases may exercise peremptory challenges based on gender; currently, the circuits are
split on this issue. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
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the Court in Batson v. Kentucky. The issue required a balancing of a
juror's equal protection rights and a defendant's right to a fair trial.
McCollum has now essentially placed the juror's right to equal pro-
tection above the rights of a criminal defendant. This Note argues
that the majority's decision to extend Batson and Edmonson will have
great implications for future criminal and civil cases. For example,
the exercise of peremptory challenges by any party to a criminal or
civil trial will now be considered a state action, and all parties in
both civil and criminal trials will have standing to bring a claim on
behalf ofjurors. Furthermore, limits on the use of peremptory chal-
lenges will likely be extended in the future, to include cases where
the defendant is a racial minority and the jurors are Caucasian.
Though this decision may potentially harm defendants, the Court
acted properly in preserving the integrity of the criminal trial by
prohibiting a court from condoning discrimination.
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